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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law-Self-Incrimination-Production of Client's Work
Papers in Possession of Attorney May Be Compelled When Client Has Never
Been in Physical Possession-White, an attorney representing two taxpayers in
a federal tax investigation obtained work papers (prepared by taxpayers' inde-
pendent accountant prior to the investigation) directly from the accountant.
Directed by summons1 to produce these papers, White refused, asserting his
clients' fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.- The district court'
refused to permit White to assert this privilege on the grounds that the tax-
payers themselves had neither owned nor possessed the work papers4 and ordered
White to obey the summons.5 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed.6 Assuming, without deciding the issue, that White could assert his
clients' fifth amendment privilege, 7 the court concluded that the fifth amend-
ment would not protect White's clients from the compelled production of work
papers owned and prepared by an accountant and in the physical possession of
their attorney s United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973).
When the Internal Revenue Service issues a summons to compel the produc-
tion of documents relating to the tax liability of a taxpayer, there are three
possible theories by which the documents may be protected from compelled
production: 1) a statutory accountant-client privilege; 2) the common law
attorney-client privilege; 3) the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. The privilege applicable in a given situation depends upon the person
summoned and the relationship between the parties.
While there is no common law accountant-client confidential communication
privilege, 9 several states have created statutory accountant-client privileges.
1. United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973). As the court noted, the summons
was issued pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1964). Id. at 760 n.4.
2. The fifth amendment provides, in part, that: "No person shall.. . be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself .... " US. Const. amend. V.
3. United States v. White, 326 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Tex. 1971), afi'd, 477 F.2d 757 (5th
Cir. 1973). The enforcement proceeding was brought pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b),
7604(a) (1964). 326 F. Supp. at 461.
4. The district court denied taxpayers' request to intervene in the enforcement proceeding
in order to assert their own fifth amendment privilege on grounds that they failed to show a
significantly protectable interest in the work papers, since they neither owned them nor could
claim a confidential relationship with the attorney or the accountant. 326 F. Supp. at 462.
But see Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971) (indicating that a potential privilege
may suffice). See also notes 57-60 infra and accompanying text with regard to the insignifi-
cance of ownership in establishing a criterion for a protectable interest in documents.
5. 326 F. Supp. at 464-65.
6. United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757, 764 (Sth Cir. 1973).
7. Id. at 762.
8. Id. at 763-64.
9. Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682, 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 US. 1006 (1956);
Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); 8
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The enactment of such statutes"0 has created a choice of law dilemma for the
federal courts located in those states with regard to federal tax cases. 1
In Falsone v. United States,'2 an accountant ordered to comply with a sum-
mons issued by the Internal Revenue Service for production of his client's tax
records appealed, arguing that the proceeding was a civil case governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that, therefore, the state-created accoun-
tant-client privilege was available. 18 The court, however, interpreting Rule 81
(a) (3),14 held that the original proceeding was an administrative proceeding
to which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not apply.1' While this de-
Wigmore, Evidence § 2286 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). The need for the privilege was not
recognized during the evolutionary period of the common law privileges and subsequent en-
largement of common law privileges has been discouraged by a policy which favors tho public
need for truth to the promotion of privileged disclosures between persons in "confidential"
relationships. Id. § 2192. Confidential communication privileges derived from the common law
include husband-wife, priest-penitent, attorney-client, government-informer, and Juror-Juror.
Id. §§ 2285-86.
10. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-749 (Supp. 1972); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 154-1-7(7)
(1963); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 473.141 (Supp. 1972); Ga. Code Ann. § 84-216 (1970); Ill, Ann.
Stat. ch. 110Y2, § 51 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Iowa Code Ann. § 116.15 (1949); Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 325.440 (1972); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 37.85 (1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 75A, § 21 (Supp.
1973); Mich. Comp. Laws § 338.523 (1967); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 49.185 (1971); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 20-1-12C (Supp. 1973); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 63, § 9.11(a) (1968); Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 62-143 (Supp. 1972). The Florida statute, which is typical, reads as follows: "All com-
munications between certified public accountants and public accountants and the person
for whom such ... accountant shall have made any audit or other investigation in a
professional capacity, and all information obtained by ... accountants in their professional
capacity concerning the business and affairs of clients shall be deemed privileged communi-
cations in all of the courts of this state, and no such ... accountant shall be permitted to
testify with respect to any of said matters, except with the consent in writing of such client
or his legal representative." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 473.141 (Supp. 1972). See Note, A Critical
Analysis of Accountant-Client Privilege Statutes, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 1264 (1968).
11. The significant question presented in this context is whether state attempts to create an
accountant-client privilege by statute will be effective at all in federal court since the law
governing the privileges recognized at common law such as the attorney-client privilege Is
federal common law in the federal courts. See Petersen, Attorney-Client Privilege, 54 Minn.
L. Rev. 67, 70-71 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Petersen]. The federal common law of attorney-
client privilege, however, is based largely on state decisions. See Lofts, The Attorney-Client
Privilege in Federal Tax Investigations, 19 Tax L. Rev. 405, 412-13 (1964).
12. 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953).
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) provides in part: "All evidence shall be admitted which is
admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore
applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules
of evidence applied in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States
court is held."
14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(3) provides that the rules are applicable "to proceedings to
compel the giving of testimony or production of documents in accordance with a subpoena
issued by an officer or agency of the United States under any statute of the United States
15. "Rule 81(a) (3) ...was not intended to make so radical a change in administrative
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cision indicated that a state-created accountant-client privilege would not be
available in a proceeding before the Internal Revenue Service, the Ninth Cir-
cuit' has applied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to recognize a state-
authorized attorney-client privilege17 in an enforcement proceeding before a
district court.'8 That circuit also has approved a district court's application of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (and therefore the state law attorney-
client privilege) to an administrative proceeding. 19 Read together, Falsone
and the Ninth Circuit cases2l may be indicative of an underlying federal policy
to prevent modern state-created confidential communications privileges from
proscribing effective enforcement of the revenue laws while still preserving the
attorney-client privilege recognized at common law as essential to effective legal
representation.P Therefore, the question of whether a state-created accountant-
client privilege, if available at all, is available in a federal tax case, may turn
on the type of proceeding in which it is invoked.
There is no question that the giving of advice and the preparation of docu-
ments by the attorney himself is within the attorney-client privilege.P Absent
a statutory accountant-client privilege, the question remains whether the privi-
lege may be extended to an accountant who in connection with an attorney
prepares papers for the taxpayer. The attorney-client privilege applies, according
to Judge Wyzanski's much quoted formula, only when:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the per-
procedure as to require that such agencies be restricted by the rigid rules of evidence." 205
F.2d at 742; accord, Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963); In re Albert Lindley Lee Memorial Hosp., 209 F.2d 122, 123 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1953).
16. See Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
17. The attorney was asserting the attorney-client privilege of the State of California and
the court held that state law on the privilege was controlling absent a federal statute govern-
ing the asserted privilege. Id. at 627.
18. Baird was an appeal from a citation for civil contempt issued by the district court
in an enforcement proceeding. Id. at 625.
19. Chapman v. Goodman, 219 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1955). The district court was
proceeding under Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a) (3) and fashioned an order compelling appellant to
answer all questions unless he deemed them violative of the attorney-client privilege.
20. See Petersen 76-77 pointing out that the law governing both proceedings must be
the same as a practical matter and that applying the Rules to the question of privilege in an
enforcement proceeding is in effect applying them to the administrative hearing which will be
subject to any limitations of privilege imposed by the court.
21. See FTC v. St. Regis Paper Co., 304 Fa2d 731, 734-35, (7th Cir. 1962), aligning the
Falsone and Baird cases procedurally.
22. See Petersen 79, pointing out that the congressional grant of investigatory power given
the Internal Revenue Service is an indication of congressional intent to encourage full dis-
closure in tax investigations and that federal recognition of one state-created privilege, such
as the accountant-client privilege, could entail recognition of them all to the detriment of
effective enforcement of the revenue laws.
23. See Colton v. United States, 306 Fad 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 US. 951
(1963); United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2nd Cir. 1961).
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son to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or
his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by
his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing pri-
marily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some
legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4)
the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client.24
Since disclosure to a stranger under this formula would destroy the privilege,
the question must be: when is an accountant sufficiently involved in the attor-
ney-client relationship so that the privilege is not nullified? In United States v.
Kovel,as a case where the accountant was an actual employee of the attorney,
the Second Circuit pointed out:
Nothing in the policy of the privilege suggests that attorneys, simply by placing ac-
countants, scientists or investigators on their payrolls and maintaining them in their
offices, should be able to invest all communications by clients to such persons with a
privilege the law has not seen fit to extend when the latter are operating under their
own steam. 26
The court, however, expressly extended the privilege beyond the attorney and
his "menial or ministerial" employees to an accountant in the employ of an
attorney. In Kovel, a tax attorney directed his client to tell his story in the first
instance to an accountant who was a full time employee of the attorney's firm,
so that the accountant could interpret the information for the attorney. After a
summons was directed to the accountant to disclose the information, the court
held that such a communication was within the attorney-client privilege27 and
indicated that the criterion to be applied was whether the communication
24. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-61 (D. Mass. 1950)
where it was held the privilege could not be asserted when an attorney's client sought only an
accounting service from the attorney rather than legal advice.
25. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
26. Id. at 921. The Second Circuit regards the decision as to when a non-attorney may be
included within the attorney-client privilege to be governed on the one hand by a general
policy to restrict testimonial privilege in the interest of gathering the truth and on the other
hand by a policy which recognizes that to insure effective litigation it is essential that a client
be able to place unrestricted confidence in his attorney's professional agent as well as in his
attorney, since the complexity of modern existence prevents attorneys from providing effective
legal representation without the help of others. Id.
27. Id. at 922. The court recognized that the decision to some extent might be contra to
language in Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
860 (1949), where an accountant employed by an attorney was held to be excluded from the
privilege when a client told his story to the attorney in the presence of the accountant. The
court pointed out, however, that there was some indication in Himmelfarb that the Informa-
tion transmitted to the attorney was to be turned over to the Internal Revenue Service by
the attorney with the client's consent, thereby destroying the element of confidentiality neces-
sary for the attorney himself to invoke the privilege. Id. at 922 n.3. But see Garlepy v.
United States, 189 F.2d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 1951), approving Himmelfarb. The Ninth Circuit
itself apparently overruled lImmelfarb sub silentio in United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1963). See also notes 29-31 infra and accompanying text.
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was made "in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the
lawyer."J28
In United States v. Judson,29 the Ninth Circuit followed Kovel and extended
the privilege to cover an accountant not in the employ of an attorney. In Judson,
an attorney consulted by a taxpayer under investigation requested that the
taxpayer retain an accountant to prepare the taxpayer's data for the attorney.
The accountant turned over all data and work papers to the attorney before
any summons was issued and the subpoena for production of the documents
was issued to the attorney.30 The court found that the accountant's work papers
prepared at the attorney's request in the course of the attorney-client relation-
ship and for the purpose of advising and defending the client were within the
attorney-client privilege, despite the fact that it was the client who had retained
the accountant 31
In the case of the accountant retained by the client to prepare work papers
and documents on his behalf, before the inception of an attorney-client relation-
ship, it is generally agreed that the pre-existing document exception 32 to the
attorney-client privilege precludes the successful assertion of the privilege. Thus,
production of such documents and work papers may be compelled from the
attorney unless they can be protected by another privilege3 3 such as the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
28. 296 F.2d at 922. The Supreme Court has never expressed its view on the scope of the
attorney-client privilege with regard to work papers or other communications involving an
accountant under the direction of an attorney. The issue was before the Court in Reisman v.
Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964) but the case was disposed of on procedural grounds. See note
32 infra.
29. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
30. Id. at 462.
31. Id. See also Bauer v. Orser, 258 F. Supp. 338 (D.N.D. 1966), where the attorney him-
self retained the accountant to assist him in representing clients. The court in Judson also
found that bank statements and cancelled checks used by the accountant were not within the
attorney-client privilege since they did not constitute a confidential communication between
attorney and client. 322 F2d at 463. In Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964), the accoun-
tant was retained by the client to assist the attorney, but the summons for the work papers
was issued to the accountant before he turned the documents over to the attorney. The dis-
trict court held that the accountant's work papers did not fall within the attorney-client
privilege. A reading of Reisman and Judson together on this point leads to the rather
anomalous conclusion that the viability of the privilege in this situation depends on whether
the summons is issued before or after the accountant completes his work and turns the re-
sults over to the attorney.
32. Under the pre-existing document rule the attorney-client privilege may not be asserted
to protect documents which came into existence prior to the establishment of the attorney-
client relationship. See generally 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2307 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961);
McCormick, Evidence § 89 (2d ed. 1972). The controlling principle is that "if a document
would be subject to an order for production if it were in the hands of the client it will be
equally subject to such an order if it is in the hands of the attorney." Id. at 185 (footnote
omitted).
33. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913); United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460
(9th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
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Although the fifth amendment might appear to apply only to oral com-
munications, the Supreme Court extended the privilege to documents as well
at an early date.0 4 In tax investigations, when a summons has been issued for
production of documents relating to a taxpayer's liability, the taxpayer may
assert his own fifth amendment privilege with regard to the documents. If the
summons is directed to his attorney, accountant or other person in physical
possession of the documents, that person may attempt to assert the privilege
on behalf of the taxpayer.3
There is general agreement in the case law that the fifth amendment privilege
is a personal privilege, adhering basically to the person rather than to the
documents or other information which may incriminate him.80 This rule, how-
ever, is not necessarily construed to mean that only the privilege-holder himself
may assert the privilege. It is recognized that in some circumstances the attorney
for the privilege-holder may assert the privilege on behalf of his client. 7
In tax cases involving a summons directed to an attorney in physical posses-
sion of the documents, the issue of who may assert the privilege is sometimes
confused with a second issue of whether the client has any fifth amendment
privilege in the documents. Application of Hous s was the first tax case in
which an attorney attempted to assert his client's fifth amendment privilege
with regard to documents in his physical possession. In that case a taxpayer-
client directed his accountant to turn over all records pertaining to the taxpayer
951 (1963) (appellant's blanket refusal to produce documents while asserting attorney-client
privilege held unjustified) ; Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956) (none of
documents covered by attorney-client privilege).
34. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), (production of invoices purporting to
show the quantity of glass illegally imported could not be compelled from the defendant).
35. In the case where the summons is issued to one other than the taxpayer, who is in
physical possession of the documents, the taxpayer may attempt to intervene in the enforce-
ment proceeding pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2). See Donaldson v. United States, 400
U.S. 517, 523 (1971) (permission to intervene denied because records sought did not belong
to the taxpayer, but to a corporation); cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973),
(summons directed to accountant and petitioner permitted to intervene to assert the fifth
amendment privilege because she was able to establish title in the documents; the question of
confidential communication privilege vis-a-vis the accountant was not raised).
36. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973). See also Johnson v. United States,
278 U.S. 457 (1913).
37. See Brody v. United States, 243 F.2d 378 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957)
(attorney appearing before court as counsel permitted to object to a proposed order on the
ground that it would compel his client to incriminate himself). See also United States v.
Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 976 (1964) (attorney called before
a grand jury as witness could not refuse to testify on the ground that his testimony would
incriminate his client); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963) (attorney
acting as counsel could not assert his client's privilege apparently, however, because the court
felt that the client had no privilege) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing & Supply
Co., 19 F.R.D. 334 (E.D. Wis. 1956) (privilege held not assertable by one not the attorney
of the privilege-holder).
38. 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
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to an attorney in order to facilitate the attorney's representing him in a pending
investigation. The court held that the attorney could assert his client's fifth
amendment privilege, noting that any other decision would result in the client's
waiving his constitutional rights unless he himself participated in all the pro-
ceedings.3 9 The issue of whether the client retained any fifth amendment privi-
lege in the documents turned on whether the controlling criterion was ownership
or possession of the documents.40 A California statute41 provided that work
papers were the property of the accountant absent an express agreement to the
contrary, and there was such an agreement in this case. The court, however,
establishing a test of possession, held that documents protected by the con-
stitutional privilege were those which were in the taxpayer's indefinite, rightful
possession in a purely personal capacity, and that the taxpayer's personal papers
were privileged 2 The court in House therefore did not make a distinction be-
tween attorney and client with regard to possession in a "personal capacity,"
apparently equating the physical possession of the attorney in the course
of the attorney-client relationship with possession in a personal capacity by
the client.4
In United States v. Boccuto,44 the work papers in question were prepared by
taxpayers' accountant and turned over to their attorney at their request. The
summons was directed to the attorney. The court confused the question of
possession with the issue of whether the privilege-holder himself must assert
the privilege and concluded, contrary to House, that the attorney could not
39. Id. at 100.
40. The government argued that the work papers were the property of the accountant and
that only the legal owner would be able to invoke the fifth amendment privilege. This should
not be confused with the issue of who may assert the privilege; presumably the House court,
even had it upheld the government's argument, would have permitted the attorney of an
accountant to assert the privilege on his behalf in a proper case.
41. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5037 (West 1962). Public accountancy acts enacted in many
states provide in most instances that ownership is in the accountant absent an express agree-
ment to the contrary.
42. 144 F. Supp. at 101. Possession in a purely "personal capacity" apparently means
possession by one who cannot-in any sense be construed to be a representative of the owner
of the documents. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), where documents in
possession of a labor union officer, owned by the union, were compellable from the officer
although they tended to incriminate him; accord, Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911)
where a corporate officer was compelled to produce incriminating documents belonging to the
corporation despite the fact that he had prepared them himself. The rationale behind this is
that a custodian in a representative capacity impliedly waives his personal privilege by
accepting custody of the documents. Id. at 382.
43. A contrary conclusion would nullify the privilege with respect to the client, since
he was never in physical possession of the documents and his only claim to any type of
possession was derived from the attorney's physical possession. The court expressly held
that the work papers were not covered by the attorney-client privilege since they were created
before the inception of the attorney-client relationship. See note 32 supra and accompanying
text.
44. 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d 860 (3d Cir. 1959).
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assert his clients' fifth amendment rights in the documents because possession
of the accountant's work papers by the attorney was not a personal possession,
but possession in a representative capacity. 45 This conclusion was uncalled
for.46 The fact of possession by the attorney is irrelevant to the issue of whether
the attorney may assert any fifth amendment privilege that the client may have
in the documents since the only established criterion is whether the attorney is
acting in his capacity as counsel for the client in the proceeding.47 In addition,
the fact that the attorney physically possesses the documents in a represen-
tative capacity with respect to the client does not lead inevitably to the con-
clusion that any derivative possession the client may have in the documents
as a result of his attorney's physical possession must be in a representative
capacity rather than a personal capacity vis--vis the owner of the documents.
The court, however, rendered the issue nugatory by deciding in the first in-
stance that the client had no fifth amendment privilege in the documents to be
asserted. The court felt that the documents were the property of the accoun-
tant, despite the fact that the accountant had released all claim to title, and
found therefore that the taxpayer had no fifth amendment privilege in them. 48
This seems contrary to House, where the court's decision apparently would not
have been affected had the taxpayer not owned the work papers. The court there
felt that no "narrow concept of property law should determine the availability
of Constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination. 4 0
The circuit courts have divided on the issue of whether the attorney may
assert his client's fifth amendment privilege when confronted with a summons
for production of documents which may incriminate his client. In Bouschor v.
United States,5" the client's work papers were prepared by an accountant and
turned over to the attorney at his request after they had been examined by
Internal Revenue agents. The court held that the attorney could not assert his
client's fifth amendment privilege, despite the fact that the claimant was the
attorney of the privilege-holder. 51 The court construed the privilege to be purely
personal. Although the court did not decide the issue, even had the attorney's
assertion been sustained, the result should be the same since the client in all
likelihood waived his privilege with regard to documents which already had
45. Id. at 889.
46. In United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 465-66 (9th Cir. 1963), the court noted that
it could not determine whether the holding in Boccuto was that the attorney had no standing
to raise his clients' privilege or whether lack of possession on the part of the client was fatal
to the clients' claim regardless of who asserted the privilege.
47. See notes 38-39 supra and accompanying text.
48. 175 F. Supp. at 890. New Jersey has no public accountancy statute. See note 10 supra.
49. 144 F. Supp. at 101.
50. 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963).
51. Id. at 458-59. The court cited Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), as the controlling
authority. Hale did not involve an attorney-client relationship, but did say that there were
cases holding that an attorney could not raise his client's fifth amendment privilege. 201 U.S.
at 70. See note 55 infra for a compilation of federal cases where an attorney has not been
permitted to assert his client's privilege on the basis of Hale, but which resemble Bouschor
in that the client for one or more reasons had no privilege.
[Vol. 42
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been examined by Internal Revenue.52 Furthermore, ownership of the docu-
ments had not been dearly established, although the court considered this
relevant to the attorney-client privilege issue.0
In United States v. Judson, 4 the client's cancelled checks and bank state-
ments were in the possession of the attorney; the summons was directed to the
attorney. The court held as a matter of constitutional law that an attorney may
assert his client's fifth amendment privilege, noting that "the taxpayer walked
into his attorney's office unquestionably shielded with the Amendment's protec-
tion, and [would walk] out with something less"' 5 were the decision any other
way. The court felt that it was undisputed that, had the client invoked the
privilege on his own behalf, the documents would not be compellable. It is not
clear whether this conclusion is a result of the fact that the client owned the
documents or resulted from the court's disinclination to draw a distinction be-
tween possession of personal papers by an attorney and possession by the
client.5 6
52. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951), where the Court stated that
once incriminating facts have been revealed without claiming the privilege, the privilege
cannot be invoked to avoid disclosure of the details; United States v. Buck, 356 F. Supp. 370,
376 (S.D. Tex. 1973), where a taxpayer transferred records to a receiver pursuant to court
order and without objection. The court ruled that the taxpayer had waived his fifth amend-
ment privilege by failing to raise the issue in the initial receivership proceeding.
53. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
54. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the attorney-client privilege issue in Judson.
55. 322 F.2d at 466. The court, in distinguishing prior case law on the issue of whether
the privilege-holder must invoke the privilege, cited: Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), as
standing for the proposition that the fifth amendment privilege does not extend to corpora-
tions; Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1910), for the fifth amendment privilege not
extending to corporate officials when compelled to produce documents which tend to incrimi-
nate them; United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1943), for the same principle applied to
certain unincorporated associations. 322 F.2d at 463. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886). But see In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961); In re Brumbaugh, 62-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. ff 9521 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
The court also distinguished the following cases on the basis that the client had no privilege:
Ziegler v. United States, 174 F.2d 439 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 822 (1949) (privilege
asserted by an attorney whose client had waived it); Falsone v. United States, 205 F2d 734
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953) and London v. Everett H. Dunbar Corp.,
179 F. 506 (1st Cir. 1910) (privilege asserted by an attorney concerning corporate records
outside the scope of the client's privilege); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1961),
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 866 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 352 US. 833 (1956) and
Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1953), vacated, 347 U.S. 227 (1954)
(attorney asserted privilege concerning incriminating matter not owned or posessed by his
client); In re Blumenburg, 191 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) and Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. American Plumbing & Supply Co., 19 F.R.D. 334 (E.D. Mis. 1956) (privilege asserted
by one not the attorney of the privilege-holder). 322 F.2d at 464-65.
56. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. Had the taxpayer-client successfully
intervened in the proceeding to assert his own fifth amendment privilege, the issue of the
effect of ownership and whether or not possession by the attorney is equivalent to possession
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The issue of whether ownership or possession should be the controlling factor
in determining whether a client has a fifth amendment privilege with regard to
documents or work papers prepared by an accountant was squarely before the
Supreme Court in Couch v. United States. 57 There, the Court concluded that
the taxpayer herself could not assert her privilege against self-incrimination to
prevent production of work papers when the papers had remained continuously
in the possession of the accountant for fifteen years before a summons was
directed to the accountant, despite the fact that the taxpayer owned the
documents. 58
The Court specifically stated that "no . . . Fifth Amendment claim can
prevail where, as in this case, there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy
and no semblance of governmental compulsion against the person of the ac-
cused." 59 The Court in Couch also expressly declined to formulate a broad
constitutional rule regarding the quality of possession that a taxpayer need
establish to invoke the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
successfully. 0
Although Couch is a case involving possession by the taxpayer's accountant,
it has application in cases where the taxpayer's attorney is in possession of the
documents prepared by an accountant since it has narrowed the question of
possession versus ownership to a determination of the quality of possession. The
Court, however, left open the question of whether, in view of the expectation
of privacy inherent in the attorney-client relationship,0 1 the attorney's posses-
sion of the work papers is sufficient to preserve the client's fifth amendment
privilege. 62 It would seem that the privilege is preserved at least in the cases
where the documents have been prepared by an accountant acting in the employ
of or at the direction of an attorney. It is these cases, however, in which the
documents already are protected from compelled production by the attorney-
by the client would have been squarely before the court. See United States v. Cohen, 388
F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967), where the taxpayer asserted his own fifth amendment privilege in
answer to a summons directed to him for work papers prepared by the accountant but
in the possession of the taxpayer. The court held that physical possession was enough,
57. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
58. Id. at 334. The summons initially was issued to the accountant who subsequently
turned the papers over to petitioner's attorney at petitioner's request before the return day of
the summons. Petitioner intervened in the enforcement proceeding, asserting ownership of
records warranted a fifth amendment privilege to bar production. Id. at 325.
59. Id. at 336 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. n.20.
61. This expectation of privacy in the attorney-client relationship apparently is preserved
despite the presence of an accountant, at least when the accountant is acting in the employ of
or at the direction of the attorney. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
62. The Court cited two cases as illustrations of "constructive possession": United States v.
Guterma, 272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959), where the taxpayer stored personal papers in a
corporation safe and the summons was issued to the corporation; the taxpayer successfully
moved to quash as to his personal papers; Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956), where an attorney's records were stored on corpora-
tion premises and the summons was issued to the corporation, 409 U.S. at 333-34 n.16.
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client privilege and no question of possession as opposed to ownership is logically
involved with this privilege.63 Therefore, the taxpayer in this situation who is
attempting to protect his work papers from compelled production has, from a
practical point of view, gained nothing from Couch.
On the other hand, the taxpayer whose papers and documents were prepared
by an accountant independent of the attorney-client relationship and which
therefore are excluded from the attorney-client privilege" has at least the poten-
tial of gaining the fifth amendment privilege through Couch since the element
of ownership upon which these cases frequently have turned in the pastG5 has
been eliminated by Couch. Exactly this issue was before the Fifth Circuit in
United States v. White,68 although the decision is clouded by the fact that the
summons, directed to an attorney to whom the accountant had turned over work
papers relating to his clients' tax liability, was at least arguably unenforceable
on the ground that its sole purpose was to obtain evidence for a criminal
prosecution.Y The taxpayers in White had never been in physical possession of
63. See notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text. But see Bouschor v. United States, 316
F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963), where the court confused the pre-existing documents exception to
the attorney-client privilege with ownership of the documents.
64. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
65. See notes 44-56 supra and accompanying text.
66. 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973).
67. Prior to attorney White's association with taxpayers and with the aid of the accoun-
tant the taxpayers had submitted to the Internal Revenue Service an offer in compromise of
their tax liability for the years 1962-1965. Id. at 759. The offer in compromise was with-
drawn, however, prior to this proceeding, and the summons directed to White encompassed
only those work papers used in preparing taxpayers' returns for the years 1966 through 1968.
At the time enforcement was sought, there had been no recommendation to prosecute tax-
payers on any ground, but a recommendation for criminal prosecution was made subsequent
to the time the civil summons was issued to White. In answer to the attorney's assertion
that the summons was unenforceable because its sole purpose uas to obtain evidence for a
criminal prosecution both the majority and minority opinions in White recognized that
Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971), is the controlling authority. In Donaldson,
the Court noted that a defense that the material sought to be compelled by the summons is
sought for the improper purpose of obtaining evidence for use in a criminal prosecution is
applicable to the situation of a pending criminal charge or at most an investigation brought
solely for the purpose of bringing criminal charges. Id. at 532-33. The Court held that under
26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1970) a summons may be issued in aid of an investigation if issued in
good faith and prior to a recommendation for prosecution. 400 U.S. at 535-36. The Court
further pointed out that a full scale tax fraud investigation involving special agents results,
statistically, in a criminal prosecution in only half the cases investigated. Id. at 535 n.17. For
this reason, the Court felt that the presence of a special agent on the case (as in White) was
not indicative of bad faith or of intent to prosecute on the part of the Internal Revenue
Service. Id. at 535-36. The issue that divided the White court was the good faith require-
ment of Donaldson. The majority felt that as long as no recommendation for prosecution had
been made prior to the time the summons was issued or subsequently at the enforcement
proceeding, no bad faith was shown. 477 F.2d at 761. The dissent, however, felt that bad faith
was indicated since the recommendation for prosecution was made while the appeal on the
enforcement proceeding was pending, a time at which the government presumably still lacked
1973]
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the documents. The court directed its attention first to the issue of whether an
attorney could assert his client's fifth amendment privilege in the documents.
The court noted the division in the cases as to whether the privilege is so strictly
personal that even an attorney may not assert it on his client's behalf despite
the heavy burden that would be imposed on a taxpayer should he be required
to attend every proceeding in order to be available to assert his own privilege.08
The court then assumed, expressly without deciding the issue, that an attorney
may assert his client's fifth amendment privilege on his behalf in an enforce-
ment proceeding. 69 By deciding subsequently that the taxpayers had no fifth
amendment rights in the documents, the court rendered the issue of who may
assert the privilege nugatory. The court, therefore, was not compelled to decide
the issue. Neither, however, was the court compelled logically to attempt to ap-
proach this issue first since a negative decision on either issue would preclude
the other.70
Following its non-resolution of this issue, the court turned to the question
of whether the taxpayers had retained any fifth amendment privilege in docu-
ments which were in the physical possession of their attorney. The court looked
to Couch v. United States71 as the controlling authority and concluded:
"The lesson to be drawn from Couch, then, is that unless the taxpayer is actually in
possession of documents sought by the government-or clearly has constructive pos-
session-he will be unable to seek the shelter of the fifth amendment because he will
not be the object of any impermissible governmental compulsion." '72
While this may be a fair reading of Couch, the court further noted that the
Couch decision cited examples of constructive possession sufficient to invoke
the fifth amendment privilege in cases where the taxpayer had placed papers
in a third party's possession for "custodial safe-keeping," 73 but completely
ignored the fact that the Court in Couch expressly stated that it was not for-
mulating a broad constitutional rule as to the quality of possession necessary
to invoke the fifth amendment. 74 Neither of the examples cited by the Court
involved an attorney acting for a client in the course of the attorney-client
relationship.
the information upon which to base either a criminal prosecution or a civil case, leaving the
impression that the government had delayed its recommendation to take advantage of the
civil summons. Id. at 765 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
68. See notes 34-56 supra and accompanying text.
69. 477 F.2d at 762.
70. The court may have felt compelled to approach this issue first by the tradition of
the standing doctrine in the federal courts, where the courts in an effort of self-restraint
attempt to avoid deciding constitutional issues by first determining whether the litigant has
standing to litigate, i.e., whether the litigant may assert the rights of another. See generally
Wright, Federal Courts § 13 (2d ed. 1970). There is, however, no point to approaching the
issue first and then not deciding it.
71. 409 U.S. 322 (1973); see notes 57-65 supra and accompanying text.
72. 477 F.2d at 763.
73. See note 62 supra.
74. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
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The court in White also noted that according to its own reasoning the tax-
payer in Couch was in a better position than the taxpayer in White to claim
constructive possession of papers in the hands of her accountant because she
owned the documents in question and thereby retained the right to immediate
possessionY5 This rationale, taken together with the court's assumption that
Couch also requires the possession of the third party to be custodial in na-
ture, completely blunts the intent of the Couch decision to delimit the fifth
amendment privilege in documents by possession rather than by ownership.
The court finally held that since the taxpayers had never been in physical
possession of the documents70 and presumably, therefore, could not have put
their attorney in custodial possession on their behalf, they had no fifth amend-
ment privilege in the documents because "the necessary ingredient of personal
compulsion against White's clients [was] totally lacking . . . . 7 The court
emphasized that the taxpayers had never been in physical possession of the
documents to show, apparently, not that the taxpayers had lost their fifth
amendment privilege when the documents were turned over to the attorney by
the accountant, but rather that the taxpayers never had a fifth amendment
privilege in the documents and did not gain one by the shift of physical
possession from their accountant to an attorney acting in their behalf.
The dissent in White, after first deciding that an attorney may assert his
clients' fifth amendment rights with regard to documents in his possession,"
reached a more satisfactory conclusion than the majority. The dissent first di-
rectly stated that papers in the physical possession of an attorney for the
benefit of the clients are held by the attorney in constructive possession on
behalf of the clients. 9 Although the dissent did not define constructive posses-
sion, it stated that the Couch Court had held that the fifth amendment privilege
does not apply to a client's otherwise privileged documents which are in the
possession of an accountant,8 0 and that the Couch situation can be distinguished
from that in White on the element of the expectation of privacy inherent in the
attorney-client relationship guaranteed by the sixth amendment s ' right to
counsel.8 2
As has been noted 8 3 the problem with this rationale is that when the accoun-
tant has been retained prior to the attorney's involvement in the case and not
in the course of the attorney-client relationship, there is a serious question as
to whether there is any legitimate expectation of privacy in connection with
75. 477 F.2d at 763 n.17.
76. The documents were placed in the indefinite possession of the attorney by the accoun-
tant. Id. at 764 n.1 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 764 (majority opinion).
78. Id. at 765-66 (Ainsworth, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 766.
80. Id.
81. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const. amend. WI.
82. 477 F.2d at 766 (Ainsworth, 3., dissenting).
83. See notes 61-65 supra and accompanying text.
19731
FORDIJAM LAW REVIEW
documents prepared by the accountant, absent a recognized accountant-client
privilege, since as pre-existing documents there is no attorney-client privilege
with regard to them.8 4 The statement, however, could be interpreted as meaning
that when the client's work papers and documents are in the physical possession
of an accountant and the summons is directed to the accountant, the element
of personal compulsion associated with the fifth amendment privilege which
acts on the claimant-client himself is missing. When the work papers are in the
physical possession of an attorney and the summons is directed to the attorney,
then an element of personal compulsion acting on the claimant is supplied through
a potential inhibition of his exercise of his sixth amendment right to counsel.
Underlying the White court's refusal to extend the Couch concept of con-
structive possession to cover papers in the physical possession of a client's
attorney seems to be the fear that under such a rule a client could prevent
discovery of his documents simply by entrusting them to an attorney.8 Such a
rationale overlooks, however, the fact that under the Couch test of possession,
the accountant's client could have prevented discovery of her papers by trans-
ferring them to her own physical possession before summons was served. Pre-
sumably the clients in White could have obtained physical possession of the
documents from the accountant as readily as their attorney did and could have
then transferred them to the attorney and thereby created and preserved a
fifth amendment privilege in the documents which did not exist when the docu-
ments were in the physical possession of the accountant. The distinction be-
tween the client's obtaining possession of the documents himself and authorizing
his attorney to obtain possession on his behalf in the course of the attorney-
client relationship is therefore of questionable import.8 Such a distinction places
a burden on the taxpayer who happens to engage an attorney at the wrong
time in the course of events. There is no need for all pre-existing documents
prepared by an accountant to be protected from discovery by an extension of
the attorney-client privilege. It would seem, however, that documents prepared
by an accountant which may tend to incriminate the taxpayer and which would
be protected in the hands of the taxpayer himself by the fifth amendment should
be protected equally in the hands of the attorney when he has come to possess
the documents in the course of the attorney-client relationship with the tax-
payer, regardless of the fact that the origin of the documents is outside the
attorney-client relationship. Any other result places the taxpayer in the position
of being better off without an attorney, unless he is aware of the technicality
created by White. Without an attorney, the taxpayer under investigation would
most likely obtain physical possession of such documents himself, but with an
attorney he would most likely leave the whole matter in counsel's hands, and,
84. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
85. The court noted that, in Couch, taxpayer's papers had been transferred from the
accountant to the attorney after service of summons, but that the Court treated the
case as if all rights and obligations were fixed at the time of service of summons. 477 F.2d at
762 n.12.
86. See text accompanying note 43 supra for one instance where a district court refused to
make such a distinction.
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under White, conceivably lose his fifth amendment rights. Such a result can
punish the taxpayer for exercising his sixth amendment right to engage counsel
in a potentially criminal matter.
Securities-Non-Fiduciary Tippees Held Liable Under State Common
Law for Inside Information Trading Profits: Diamond Cuts Deeper.-
Plaintiffs, shareholders in Lum's, Inc., a Florida restaurant franchising corpora-
tion, sued derivatively in the Southern District of New York, alleging that de-
fendant tippees were jointly and severally liable to the corporation for misusing
confidential corporate information for their own advantage. Plaintiffs based their
claim on Diamond v. Oreamuno,' a New York Court of Appeals decision which
held a corporate officer and director liable to the corporation under state law for
profits derived from trading the corporation's securities on the basis of material
inside information, and they argued that Diamond should be extended to out-
siders who receive and misuse inside information. The district court found
Diamond readily distinguishable, and dismissed the complaint.2 The Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals found that the corporation suffers the same harm from the
misuse of inside information by outsiders as from misuse by an officer or
director.3 Moreover, the reasoning continued, a party receiving inside information
from a corporate officer or director becomes a fiduciary with respect to the infor-
mation, and thus has a duty not to use it for his own advantage.4 Accordingly, the
court of appeals reversed, and held defendant tippees jointly and severally liable
to the corporation for the profits realized from the inside information trading,
despite the absence of trading (and hence the absence of profit) by some of them
who had merely passed along the information to those who did trade? Schein v.
Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973).
One of the primary objectives of the disclosure requirements of the federal
securities laws,0 and the regulations promulgated thereunder, is to insure that all
investors have relatively equal access to material information so as to enable them
to make informed investment decisions. The protection of the investing public
demands that the use of such information by persons occupying an intimate rela-
tionship with the issuer be prevented.8 Prior to the passage of these acts, insider
1. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969).
2. Gildenhorn v. Lum's, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 329, 333-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
3. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42
U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Sept. 6, 1973) (No. 73-440).
4. Id. at 823.
5. Id. at 824.
6. See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970) ; Trust Indenture Act
of 1939, id. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb; Securities Exchange Act of 1934, id. §§ 7&a-78hh; Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, id. §§ 79 to 79b-6; Investment Company Act of 1940, id.
§§ 80a-1 to 80a-52.
7. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
8. Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970); Brennan v. Midwestern United
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speculation was an established practice, which enabled insiders to reap large
profits, often at the expense of outsiders who, without the privileged information,
took greater market risks.0 The common law remedies to correct the unscrupulous
fleecing of investors were inadequate, since the burden of proving the traditional
elements of fraud was heavy,"0 and there was but a slight duty of disclosure."
Recovery thus was rare in cases involving unfair trading in corporate securities,
particularly where insider trading on undisclosed information was present."
Occasionally, however, relief was granted when "special facts" could be shown
or when the defendant occupied a fiduciary relationship with respect to the other
party to the transaction.'3
Undeniably, the most litigated of the antifraud provisions in the federal secu-
rities regulatory scheme is rule 10b-5,14 promulgated by the SEC in 1942 pur-
suant to section 10(b)15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Rule 10b-5 was
written in broad language so as to outlaw a wide range of deceptive practices
without regard to the technical sufficiency of the defendant's conduct as to
common law fraud standards.'" Effectuation of the broad remedial purposes of the
Exchange Act have led courts to construe rule 10b-5 "not technically and re-
Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 155 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) ; SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848, 851-52, 858 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del. 1951);
Faberge, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10174, [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. ff 79,378, at 83,103-04 (May 25, 1973) ; McDonald, Business Associations and Securities
Regulations, 21 Syr. L. Rev. 537, 549-50 (1969). See also SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963); Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437
(2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944); S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Se . 68
(1934).
9. Rubin & Feldman, Statutory Inhibitions upon Unfair Use of Corporate Information
by Insiders, 95 U. Pa. L. Rev. 468 (1947); 45 Notre Dame Law. 314, 315 (1969). Indeed, the
intent of Congress in enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to refute the Idea that
the use of inside information for personal advantage was a normal emolument of corporate
office. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 n.15 (1961).
10. 1 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud-SEC Rule 10b-5, § 2.7(1), at 55; Comment,
The Prospects for Rule X-10B-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 Yale
L.J. 1120, 1123-26 (1950). For a discussion of the elements of common law fraud see W.
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, ch. 18 (4th ed. 1971).
11. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 n.13 (1961); Comment, The Prospects for
Rule X-10B-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded Investors, 59 Yale L.J. 1120, 1125
(1950) ; 45 Notre Dame Law. 314, 315 (1970).
12. See 40 Fordham L. Rev. 985, 986 (1972).
13. 40 S.E.C. at 911 n.13; 40 Fordham L. Rev. 985, 986 (1972).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
15. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
16. A. Bromberg, supra note 10, § 2.7(1) at 55; 45 Notre Dame Law. 314, 318 (1970).
For a discussion of the elements of a rule lob-5 claim see Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 270-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Note, SEC Rule lob-5: A
Recent Profile, 13 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 860 (1972).
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strictively, but flexibly."' 71 Since 1946, when it was first held to provide a private
right of action, 18 rule 10b-5 has developed into a dynamic, widely used remedy
for defrauded purchasers and sellers of securities, with recovery being allowed
in a variety of situations involving abuses of the securities trading process. 10
Many cases involve derivative or class action attacks against multiple defendants,
with huge damage demands made2 not only against primary wrongdoers, but
against many defendants whose activities are collateral or secondary to the pri-
mary wrong.21 In addition, the procedural advantages offered plaintiffs by Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dealing with class actions, and
Rule 23.1, dealing with derivative suits, have turned the securities litigation flood
into a maelstrom. 22
Outside of federal law, Dianwnd v. Oreamuno,23 on which the Second Circuit
17. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963) ; accord, Super-
intendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
18. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). Neither section
10(b) nor rule 10b-5 explicitly provides a private civil remedy for conduct violative oi
their terms. Nevertheless, Kardon held that such a remedy could be implied. See also Super-
intendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971); J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Klein, The Extension of a Private Remedy to Defrauded Secu-
rities Investors Under SEC Rule lob-5, 20 U. Miami L. Rev. 81 (1965).
19. See Note, SEC Rule 10b-5: A Recent Profile, 13 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 860 (1972);
45 Notre Dame Law. 314, 316-17 (1970). The explosive growth of securities law fraud
litigation under rule 10b-5 has occurred primarily in the last decade, with only 54 cases in-
volving the rule litigated between 1946-1962. However, since then, the volume of litigation
has grown to well over 100 cases a year. Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law
Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Deicto, Indemnification, and Con-
tribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 598 n.1 (1972).
20. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen I1), 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1973) (No. 73-203), an antitrust action
brought on behalf of six million odd-lot investors on the New York Stock Exchange,
where damages sought were $120 million; Reilly v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 93,588 (N.D. Tex. 1972), a class
action brought on behalf of all persons who purchased shares as a result of the defendant
broker-dealer's fraudulent nondisclosures, where damages sought were $25 million.
21. Ruder, supra note 19, at 599. In Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex.
1970), a rule 10b-5 case, 93 persons, partnerships, or corporations were named as defendants.
Plaintiff argued that the "secondary" defendants, who "aided and abetted" or "conspired with"
the "primary" defendants, should share liability.
22. Since 1966, when Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 was amended, through 1971, 1339 clss actions
were filed in the Southern District of New York. Of these, 1003 were still pending at the
close of 1971. Adise v. Mather, 56 F.R.D. 492 (D. Colo. 1972). However, the recent case of
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen III), 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted,
42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1973) (No. 73-203), appears certain, if upheld, to reduce
the number of Rule 23 class actions. The decision imposes on the plaintiff the burden of
paying for notice to all members of the class who can be identified.
23. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), aff'g 29 App. Div. 2d 285, 287
N.Y.S.2d 300 (1st Dep't 1968), noted in 11 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 499 (1970); 83 Harv. L.
Rev. 1421 (1970); 18 J. Pub. L. 493 (1970); 22 MAle. L. Rev. 283 (1970); 45 Notre Dame
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based the instant holding, serves as an additional remedy against fraudulent
securities trading, and, in particular, against the use of material inside informa-
tion by insiders. Diamond was a state law derivative suit against a number of
corporate officers and directors to compel an accounting for profits acquired by
trading on the basis of inside information known to the defendants solely by
virtue of their corporate positions. The complaint alleged that the inside infor-
mation trading was a breach of fiduciary duty, and that the profits derived
therefrom rightfully belonged to the corporation. In finding the insider defen-
dants liable to the corporation for their inside information trading profits, the
New York Court of Appeals based its holding on the common law rule that "a
person who acquires special knowledge or information by virtue of a confidential
or fiduciary relationship with another is not free to exploit that knowledge or
information for his own personal benefit but must account to his principal for any
profits derived therefrom.12 4 In addition, the court relied on the rule of agency
law that "[a]n agent who acquires confidential information in the course of his
employment or in violation of his duties has a duty.., to account for any profits
made by the use of such information, although this does not harm the prin-
cipal."125 The absence of an allegation or proof of damages was held not to pre-
clude the action, since damages were thought not to be an element of a cause of
action founded on a breach of fiduciary duty.20 The court stressed that such an
action was designed not merely to compensate an injured party, but also to operate
prophylactically by preventing fiduciaries from dealing with corporate assets
for their own accounts.2 7 The court indicated that the defendants' personal use
of inside information amounted to a misappropriation by fiduciaries of a corporate
asset, and said that "[t]he primary concern, in a case such as this, is not to deter-
mine whether the corporation has been damaged but to decide, as between the
corporation and the defendants, who has a higher claim to the proceeds derived
from the exploitation of the information. '28 Thus phrased, the question was
practically a rhetorical one, and the proceeds were awarded to the corporation.2,
In addition, the court intimated that the wrongful insider trading had in fact
injured the corporation-albeit intangibly-by harming its reputation for in-
tegrity, by defacing its image of probity, and by impairing public confidence in
trading its stock.30
One of the few clear precedents foreshadowing the Diamond result was Brophy
v. Cities Service Co.31 There, the Delaware Chancery Court imposed liability for
Law. 314 (1970); 23 Sw. L.J. 921 (1969); 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 296 (1969); 55 Va. L. Rev.
1520 (1970); 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1412 (1969).
24. 24 N.Y.2d at 497, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
25. Id. at 501, 248 N.E.2d at 914, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 83 (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 388, comment c (1957)).
26. Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 498-99, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
30. Id. at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
31. 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949).
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breach of fiduciary duty on a lower-echelon corporate agent who was neither an
officer nor director, and held him accountable to the corporation in a derivative
suit for profits from inside information trading. While conceding that, ordinarily,
a mere employee does not occupy a position of trust and confidence toward his
employer, the court went on to say that if an employee acquires in the course of
his employment secret information relating to his employer's business, he
would occupy a position analogous to that of a fiduciary and would be constrained
to govern his actions accordingly.3 2 As in Diamond, the court said that where
breach of a confidential relationship by an employee is alleged, and an account-
ing for any resulting profits is sought, damage to the corporation is not a neces-
sary element of the complaint: "Public policy will not permit an employee oc-
cupying a position of trust and confidence toward his employer to abuse that
relation to his own profit, regardless of whether his employer suffers a loss.2s
Read together, Diamond and Brophy thus indicate that any agent will be held
liable to his corporation under agency principles for trading in his corporation's
securities on the basis of inside information, regardless of whether the corporation
was actually "damaged" in a monetary sense.
State law remedies for inside information trading such as Diamond and Brophy
are unquestionably valuable in filling the gaps in the federal legislation.3 4 For
example, section 16(b)3" of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes liability
to the corporation on three classes of "insiders" (directors, officers, and greater
than ten percent shareholders) for any profits derived by them from trading in
their corporation's securities within any period of less than six months. Although
this section provides an objective, automatic remedy for the corporate recovery of
"short swing" profits from insiders, 0 its inherent limitations severely restrict any
deterrent effect on inside information trading. 37 For example, in Brophy, section
16(b) would not have availed the corporation, even if short swing profits were
involved, because the defendant secretary was neither an officer, director, or
greater than ten percent shareholder, and thus did not fall within the section's
32. Id. at 244, 70 A.2d at 7.
33. Id. at 246, 70 A.2d at 8.
34. See 24 N.Y.2d at 502-03, 248 N.E.2d at 914-15, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 84-85, where the
Diamond court expressed its view as to the inadequacy of federal remedies for inside informa-
tion trading, and said that state intervention was necessary for comprehensive control of such
trading abuses. The court felt that "[in view of the practical difficulties inherent in an action
under the Federal law, the desirability of creating an effective common-law remedy is mani-
fest." Id. at 503, 248 N.E.2d at 915, 301 N.YS.2d at 85.
35. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970).
36. Section 16(b) requires only that there be a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase of a
registered equity security by one of the three classes of "insiders" within a period of less than
six months. If such circumstances exist (unless the security "was acquired in good faith in
connection with a debt previously contracted"), recovery by the issuer is automatic, regard-
less of whether inside information was used, and "irrespective of any intention on the part of
such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the
security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six
months." Id.
37. See 45 Notre Dame Law. 314, 316 (1970).
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definition of "insider." Similarly, in Diamond, the finding of common law liability
was needed if there were to be any corporate recovery, since the defendants'
trading was outside the six-month period. In addition, recovery under Diamond
would be available, but not under section 16(b), where an unregistered equity
security is involved, or where the two-year limitation period under section 16(b)
had run. Thus, although Diamond's derivative remedy closely resembles section
16(b) in policy and procedure, in that both proceed on the theory that the cor-
poration should be allowed to recover profits derived by insiders through ex-
ploitation of a fiduciary relationship,38 section 16(b) is not an effective substitute
for the common law agency cause of action based on an insider's breach of fidu-
ciary duty. Diamond's recognition of a state law cause of action for unlawful
insider trading analogous to section 16(b) was both justified by common law prin-
ciples and by the inadequacy of the corresponding federal remedy.
Another illustration of the gap-filling potential of state common law holdings
like Diamond is their use in overcoming the so-called "Birnbaum doctrine",
which, on the facts in Diamond for example, would have precluded a federal
remedy. This doctrine, alternately called the "purchaser-seller requirement" and
first enunciated by the Second Circuit in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,80
states that only a defrauded purchaser or seller has standing to sue for damages
under rule 10b-5. In Birnbaum, plaintiff, a minority shareholder of Newport Steel,
sued derivatively on behalf of his corporation, alleging that the president of
Newport Steel fraudulently had rejected a favorable merger offer and had de-
frauded the Newport shareholders by certain misrepresentations made in con-
nection with the merger negotiations. Plaintiff had neither purchased nor sold
any Newport stock, but he contended that rule 10b-5 should be construed to
include actions for breach of fiduciary duty by insiders. In dismissing the com-
plaint, the court said that section 10(b) "was directed solely at that type of
misrepresentation or fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or pur-
chase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs,
and that Rule X-10B-5 extended protection only to the defrauded purchaser or
seller."'40 In Diamond, as in the principal case,41 the corporation had neither
bought nor sold securities, nor otherwise had it been victimized in a securities
transaction to which it was a party. Thus, only the defrauded purchasers, and
not the corporation, would have standing to bring a rule 10b-5 action for
damages.42
38. See Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959), cited by the Diamond court
at 24 N.Y.2d at 500, 248 N.E,2d at 913, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 83.
39. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
40. Id. at 464.
41. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 821 n.5 (2d Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42
U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Sept. 6, 1973) (No. 73-440).
42. Although Birnbaum has been questioned by commentators, e.g., W. Painter, Federal
Regulation of Insider Trading 243 (1968) ; Lowenfels, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine,
54 Va. L. Rev. 268 (1968), and modified by the courts, the Second Circuit has refused to
repudiate the purchaser-seller requirement. Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972)
(en banc); Iriquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
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It is against this background that Judge Waterman wrote the majority opinion
in Schein v. Ckasen.43 The court posed the problem involved as "whether the
Diamond holding should extend to third parties, who, though not officers
or directors of the injured corporation, are involved with directors in a common
enterprise to misuse confidential corporate information for their own enrich-
ment. '44 The court thus immediately posited its "common enterprise" theory as
one of the bases by which it extended Diamond to provide for the issuer's re-
covery of outsider tippees' profits. The court conceded that the complaints did not
allege the existence of a prior explicit agreement to pass information between
Lum's president, Chasen, and the other defendants, but continued:
[I]t is obvious that the sequence of events detailed in the pleadings, if proved, will
substantiate the existence of a common enterprise pursuant to which Chasen was to
pass material information [concerning an earnings reduction] to Simon [a defendant
employee of defendant Lehman Brothers, a brokerage firm], Simon was to pass it to
the Mutual Funds [New Dimensions Fund, Inc. and Investors Variable Payment Fund,
Inc., both defendants], and the Funds were to capitalize on it by selling Lum's stock
prior to the time the material information was announced to and was available to the
public.45
Judge Kaufman, in dissent, found that the facts alleged "simply do not comport
with the concept of a joint enterprise, a term which implies the existence of a
prior plan to carry out a mutually beneficial project."40
A second theory relied upon by the court for the imposition of joint and
several liability on all the tippees involved was an agency rule:
denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968). Contra, Tully
v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834 (D.N.J. 1972).
In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), the court, in finding that plaintiff had standing to sue under the Birnbaum doctrine,
distinguished five decisions in the Southern District arising out of precisely the same facts as
the case under consideration. Each of the five courts had dismissed the complaints for failure
to meet the purchaser-seller requirement. The Shapiro court pointed out that in a majority
of the other cases, none of the plaintiffs had purchased or sold any of the stock involved
during the period of inside information trading; instead, the plaintiffs became shareholders
prior to the alleged violative trading, and the essence of their complaints mas that, had the
defendants disclosed the inside information, plaintiffs, too, would have sold their stock in an
effort to minimize the losses which occurred following disclosure. In Shapiro each plaintiff
had purchased within the period between the alleged violative trading and public disclosure,
and "clearly [had] standing to sue." Id. at 272. For a good discussion of standing to sue in
inside information trading cases see 169 N.Y.L.J., June 20, 1973, at 1, col. 1, wherein it is
pointed out that standing to sue in inside information trading cases is conferred solely on
shareholders who buy or sell during the period starting with the first inside information
trade, and ending when the facts become public. The investor who trades just before the inside
information trading begins, or just after effective public dissemination of the inside informa-
tion, has no cause of action.
43. 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Sept.
6, 1973) (No. 73-440).
44. Id. at 822.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 827 (dissenting opinion).
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"A person who, without being privileged to do so, intentionally causes or assists an
agent to violate a duty to his principal is subject to liability to the principal ...
A person who, with notice that an agent is thereby violating his duty to his principal,
receives confidential information from the agent, may be enjoined from disclosing it
and required to hold profits received by its use as a constructive trustee."'47
Under these principles, liability was imposed not only on the tippees who traded
(the mutual funds), but also on Lehman Brothers and Simon, who, significantly,
had not traded for their own accounts but merely had passed information on to
the mutual funds.48 Because they did not profit personally by trading in Lum's
stock, and held no share of the profits derived by the mutual funds, Lehman
Brothers and Simon argued that it would be inequitable to subject them to lia-
bility. The court dismissed the contention summarily, saying:
Lehman Brothers and Simon obviously misused inside information as much as [the
mutual funds] misused it . . . .It is well established that the liabilities of persons
engaged in a joint enterprise to commit a wrong are both joint and several liabilities
and each participant is liable to account for the profits of the other participants. 49
In addition, the defendants argued that, as outsiders, they were not Lum's
fiduciaries, and breached no duty owed to Lum's by trading on inside information.
Thus, Diamond would not be applicable.5 0 Of this contention, the court said:
[W]e cannot agree that the "stretch" of Diamond does not reach the defendants in
this case. We find nothing in the language of Diamond to suggest that co-venturers
of the director who breaches his duty should not be subject to the same liabilities as
those of the director himself for the misuse of corporate information.51
Moreover, Diamond's
cleansing effect ought to reach third parties who, through a breach of a fiduciary rela-
tionship, become traders advantageously possessed of confidential insider knowledge.
To immunize such third parties from liability to the damaged corporation would en-
courage insider "leaks" to outside friends and would defeat Diamond's purpose and
effect . 2
The court felt that the outsider defendants became fiduciaries of Lum's
through acquisition of confidential information, which was property "owned" by
the corporation.53 By using the Diamond approach, and by treating inside infor-
mation as a corporate asset,54 the court thus extended the fiduciary concepts of
47. Id. at 823-24 (opinion of the court), quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312
& comment c (1957).
48. Id. at 824.
49. Id.
50. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
51. 478 F.2d at 822 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 823.
53. Id. Cf. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1949), discussed
at text accompanying note 32 supra.
54. For a discussion of inside information as a corporate asset see Conant, Duties of Dis-
closure of Corporate Insiders Who Purchase Shares, 46 Cornell L.Q. 53, 63-66 (1960).
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Diamond to reach outsiders. According to the Schein theory of liability, tippees
who receive inside information knowing that the information is nonpublic, may, if
they convey the information to others or if they trade on it, be liable to the cor-
poration on two grounds: 1) both the insider and the tippees may be liable for
conversion of a corporate asset, and 2) the tippees would become participants in,
and aiders and abettors of, the insider's breach of duty to the corporation. Such
participation would make both an ultimate tippee, who trades on the information,
and an intermediary tippee, who merely passes it along, jointly and severally
liable with the insider for breach of fiduciary duty. This result is consistent with
the common law55 and with developing principles of secondary liability under
the federal securities laws.5 6 It should be noted that under any of the various
theories relied on by the Schein court, liability to the corporation is "automatic"
in the sense that the defendants are held liable irrespective of the fact that they
did not trade personally and profit.
Strong policy arguments support Schein's extension of Diamond's holding to
securities traders other than insider fiduciaries. Uninformed investors are as
disadvantaged vis-&-vis non-fiduciaries, tippees, and lower-echelon agents who
trade on inside information as they are vis-a-vis corporate officers and directors.
Furthermore, innovative application of the federal securities laws in recent years
has made inside information trading extremely risky, and thus Diamond/Schein
can be said to be consistent with federal policy.
The leading tipper-liability case is still SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 7
There, the court held that all defendants who accepted TGS stock options, or
who purchased TGS stock or calls, or who recommended such purchases to others,
before material information concerning certain drilling results had been disclosed
effectively to the investing public, had violated rule 10b-5. The rationale was
that one, who cannot trade himself in securities without disclosing material infor-
mation known to him, may not pass that information to others for their use in
securities transactions. The court said, in a much-quoted passage, that since the
tippees were not defendants in the action "we need not decide whether, if they
acted with actual or constructive knowledge that the material information was
undisclosed, their conduct is as equally violative of the Rule as the conduct of
their insider source, though we note that it certainly could be equally repre-
hensible."5 8
Subsequently, the tipper was ordered to pay into an escrow fund the profits
made by his tippees. 59 Also, all insider profiteers who traded were ordered to pay
their profits obtained in violation of rule 10b-5 into the escrow fund, to be held by
the corporation for three or more years, subject to disposition to individual
claimants as the court might direct. Any funds remaining at the end of the
55. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Agency § 312 (1957); Restatement of Torts
§ 876(b) & comment b (1939).
56. See Ruder, supra note 19, at 620-46.
57. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
58. Id. at 852-53.
59. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 95-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), afi'd in
part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
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escrow period would become the property of the corporation.00 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the district court order to disgorge profits."' Restitution was
thought not to impose a hardship, since the defendants were free to keep all profits
made after knowledge of the inside information became public.02 Although the
defrauded sellers, who traded without the benefit of the inside information, had
a "higher equity" than TGS to recover the defendants' profits, this fact did not
preclude conditional compensation to TGS.03 The court cited Diamond in answer
to the defendants' argument that the disgorgement order was punitive, in that it
contained no element of compensation to those who had been damaged: "[A]
corporate enterprise may well suffer harm 'when officers and directors abuse their
position to obtain personal profits' since 'the effect may be to cast a cloud on the
corporation's name, injure stockholder relations and undermine public regard for
the corporation's securities.' "G4 In addition, the court felt that unless an effective
deterrent to tipping was established, as by requiring the tipper to account for the
profits of his tippees, insider trading transactions could be concluded by a relative
or acquaintance of the insider, or agreements might arise under which reciprocal
tips between insiders in different corporations would be given. 5
Similar to Texas Gulf Sulphur is SEC v. Shapiro,0 holding that partners of a
financial consulting firm and their tippees had violated rule 10b-5 by purchasing
shares from the public market without disclosing information relating to the
existence and progress of merger negotiations involving the issuer. The court felt
that the proposed merger was sufficiently viable to require the defendants, in
purchasing the shares, either to disclose the nonpublic information to their sellers,
or to forego their purchases. As in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the tippers were held to
have violated rule 10b-5 by disclosing the information regardless of whether or
not they traded on it themselves.07 A trustee was appointed to locate defrauded
sellers and to pay each an "equitable and fair" amount from the profits ordered
disgorged. 8
The test of tippee liability for non-disclosure under rule 10b-5 has been ex-
panded greatly since the formulation of the "access test" in Cady, Roberts &
Co.69 There, the SEC ruled that for the disclosure obligations of rule 10b-5 to
apply, there must exist a relationship between the defendant and the issuer which
60. Id. at 93 & n.23. It is noteworthy that this was not a private action for damages.
61. 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
62. Id. at 1308.
63. Id.
64. Id. The Schein court stated that "the prestige and good will of the corporation may be
tarnished by the public revelation that the director has been involved in unethical conduct."
Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1973).
65. 446 F.2d at 1308.
66. 349 F. Supp. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
67. Id. at 54-55.
68. Id. at 56.
69. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See generally Comment, Insider Liability Under Securities
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 121 (1962); 40
Fordham L. Rev. 985, 989-90 (1972).
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would give the defendant direct or indirect access to material corporate informa-
tion intended only for corporate purposes and not for personal benefit.Y' The close
business association of the tippee and the corporate director created a sufficient
relationship with the corporation to satisfy the "access test."' Hence, tippee
liability under rule 10b-5 was found.Y2 In Ross v. Licht,73 the definition of an
"insider" was enlarged further. There, insiders held liable for inside information
trading included relatives and friends of corporate directors. The court noted that
even if these parties were not insiders, they, as tippees, would be "subject to the
same duty as insiders." 74 In addition, the court posited a third ground of lia-
bility: "[i]n any event, [defendants] would be equally liable ... for aiding and
abetting a violation of Rule 10b-5." 75
More recent cases, however, have shifted the emphasis from the nature of the
tippee-issuer relationship to the tippee's knowledge of the confidential nature of
the information. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.,76 for
example, sustained the sufficiency of a rule 10b-5 claim against a tipper broker-
dealer, and against its customers who traded on the inside information. It was
alleged merely that both tipper and tippee knew or should have known that the
information regarding an earnings decline was the "exclusive property" of the
issuer.77 The court felt that the anonymity of transactions executed on national
exchanges does not warrant abandonment of the duty to disclose, which "duty
arises when one in possession of material inside information decides to trade or
recommend the securities concerned."-," The nature of defendants' participation
in the fraud (i.e., as non-trading tippers or trading tippees) was immaterial, for
the court stated that "selling defendants, or 'tippees', who . . . knew or should
have known of the confidential nature of the information, are liable to the same
extent as insiders.1 79 It was pointed out that had Merrill Lynch not divulged the
information, and had the tippees not traded, plaintiffs' injuries could not have
been remedied, due to the eventual public disclosure of the adverse information.
But by trading on the information, defendants "assumed the duty" to disclose the
information to all potential investors.80 For breach of this duty, liability was
imposed.
That tippees who should know the confidential nature of their information
70. 40 S.E.C. at 912.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 911.
73. 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
74. Id. at 410. Tippees were defined as "persons given information by insiders in breach
of trust." Id.
75. Id. For a discussion of "aiding and abetting" under the federal securities laws see
Ruder, supra note 19, at 620-46.
76. 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
77. Id. at 269.
78. Id. at 276 (citation omitted).
79. Id. at 279.
80. Id. at 278.
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trade only at peril of 10b-5 liability was also held in SEC v. Luem's, Inc.,81 a case
arising out of the same facts as Schein. However, the current SEC view on tippee
liability may be seen in the recent cases of Faberge, Inc.8 2 and In re Investment
Management, Inc. 3 In Faberge, Inc., a corporate vice-president tipped defen-
dants of an anticipated loss in earnings. The tippees sold substantial amounts of
Faberge stock prior to public disclosure. The SEC emphasized that few practices
have so deleterious an effect on investor confidence in the securities market as
the selective disclosure of material inside information,8 4 and, noting the prolifera-
tion of incidents concerning the abuse of inside information, said that in the
future, it "will be less disposed to accord leniency in situations of this type."8' a
The SEC specifically rejected the "access test" of Cady, Roberts, saying that it
was unnecessary for liability to show that the defendants occupied a special rela-
tionship to the corporation, or, in the absence of such a relationship, that they
had actual knowledge that the information was revealed in breach of fiduciary
duty. A recipient of material inside information, who has reason to know it
emanates from a corporate source, was said to acquire a relationship with
respect to the information which is within the purview and restraints of rule
10b-5.86 The SEC refused to distinguish between direct and indirect tippees,
saying that rule 10b-5 disclosure obligations for ultimate recipients of inside
information are identical to those of direct recipients of the information, although
"there may be more questions of factual proof of the requisite knowledge" in the
former situation. 7 Tipping was said to violate rule 10b-5, whether or not one
takes advantage of the nonpublic information: "[T]he fact that the recipient may
not effect any transaction after receiving inside information does not absolve the
tipper of responsibility under the Rule." 8
In one of the most comprehensive treatments of tippee liability to date, In re
81. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ff 93,659 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
In the final adjudication of this case, the Southern District held that Lehman Bros. was
not liable for the fraud of its employee Simon. Judge Tyler held that conduct by an
employer which is negligent, at least, must be shown for respondeat superior to apply, and
that every fraud by an employee does not necessarily imply a breach of the employer's
duty of adequate supervision. SEC v. Lum's Inc., [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
U 94,134, at 94,567-68 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1973).
82. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10174, [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
9 79,378 (May 25, 1973).
83. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 78,163 (July 29, 1971).
84. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10174, [Current] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
Uf 79,378, at 83,104 (May 25, 1973).
85. Id. at 83,106.
86. Id. at 83,105.
87. Id.
88. Id. This is a logical interpretation of rule 10b-5, which proscribes conduct that
"operates" or "would operate" as a fraud or deceit. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8459, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. U 77,629, at 83,350 (Nov. 25, 1968).
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Investment Management, Inc.,89 the SEC laid down three requisites for tippee lia-
bility: 1) the information must be material and nonpublic; 2) the tippee, whether
he receives the information directly or indirectly, must know or have reason to
know that the information is nonpublic and has been obtained improperly, by
selective revelation or otherwise, and 3) the information must be a factor in the
tippee's decision to effect the transactions.00 In a foreshadowing of the "tippee
fiduciary" concept of Schein, the concurring SEC commissioner framed the third
test of tippee liability in terms of the defendants' knowing or having reason to
know that the information became available to them in breach of a duty owed
to the corporation not to disclose or use the information for non-corporate pur-
poses: "Such knowledge, in effect, renders the tippee a participant in the breach
of duty when he acts on the basis of information received.", 1
As stated by Judge Kaufman in his Schein dissent, "it is no longer debatable
that trading on inside information merits universal condemnation." 2 Because of
such judicial attitudes, and especially in the wake of Schein, inside information
traders now will find themselves subject to three lawsuits based on the same
facts: 93 1) an individual or class 10b-5 action brought by the defrauded investors
who traded without the benefit of the inside information; 2) a state law deriva-
tive suit brought for the benefit of the corporation; 3) an SEC enforcement pro-
ceeding brought for an injunction and disgorgement of profits. In addition, be-
cause of the current trend toward the elimination of privity in securities fraud
cases,94 defendants may find themselves liable to many more persons than those
with whom they have had contractual dealings. 5 As has been recently pointed
out,9 6 Schein should spawn a new breed of inside information cases (and thereby
further refine judicial consideration of what liabilities are to be imposed on inside
information traders and tippers) for two reasons. First, because it is a state
common law derivative action, rather than a rule 10b-5 case, the Birnbaum pur-
chaser-seller requirement is inapplicable. 7 Also, the Second Circuit, in Eisen v.
Carlisle & JacquelinP8 (Eisen IIl) recently has made it more difficult for plaintiffs
89. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9267, [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. J 78,163 (July 29, 1971).
90. Id. at 80,514.
91. Id. at 80,523-24 (concurring opinion).
92. Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion) (footnote
omitted), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3137 (US. Sept. 6, 1973) (No. 73-440).
93. See 170 N.Y..., July 18, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
94. See, e.g., Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970). There, the court stated that "for a claim under Rule 10b-5
the purchase or the sale need not be between plaintiff and defendant, (and] there need not be
'privity' between plaintiff and defendant." Id. at 968. See also 45 Notre Dame Law. 314, 317
(1969).
95. Ruder, supra note 19, at 618.
96. 169 N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
97. See text accompanying notes 39-42 supra.
98. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1973)
(No. 73-203).
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to prosecute class actions, by imposing the requirement that plaintiffs pay for
notice to all members of the class who can be identified with reasonable effort
A Schein derivative suit, thus, may be expected to be a preferred vehicle for the
disgorgement of inside information trading profits. Schein, in adding another
cause of action to those which may be brought against inside information traders,
has made such trading by anyone violative of state law.
Nor should the wider implications of Schein be ignored. Schein has created, in
effect, a new duty owed by outsiders to the corporation. Outsiders who receive
material inside information from a corporate fiduciary, who know it to be non-
public and attributable to the issuer, and who then pass it on, will be deemed
participants in the insider's breach of duty. Even though the outsiders do not
trade for their own accounts, they will be held jointly and severally liable to the
issuer with those who do profit from the use of the information. Even remote, or
ultimate, tippees owe the corporation a fiduciary duty. A shareholder suing
derivatively, therefore, can state a claim against such tippees to recover inside
information trading profits, although the shareholder plaintiff neither bought
nor sold stock during the period of non-disclosure. As mentioned previously,00
although the purchaser-seller requirement has been weakened considerably since
Birnbaum, it still has sufficient vitality to preclude a rule lOb-5 damage suit
against tippees on behalf of non-trading shareholders.
Because of Schein's finding that intermediary tippees, who merely pass on
inside information without trading on it themselves, will be jointly and severally
liable to the corporation for the profits of the ultimate tippees who do trade, the
future lot of the tippee will be even more unpleasant than previously. By adding
common law fiduciary obligations to tippees' liabilities and including a diversity
derivative action as a vehicle for recovery, tippees will be more wary than ever of
acting on inside information. Schein is thus commendable as a further step
towards equality among investors in securities transactions, and must be followed
if all investors trading on impersonal exchanges are to buy and sell on equal terms.
The problem of the unfair use of inside information traditionally has been subject
to a piecemeal solution; for this problem Schein represents but another ad hoc
solution.
99. See note 42 supra.
